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ABSTRACT 
We study how decision makers learn to improve performance across repeated budget 
allocation decisions. The costing system they use should be able to provide information 
that is  of incremental  value  over  mere  outcome  feedback.  We  report  an  experiment 
demonstrating that customer profitability analysis (CPA)  using  activity based costing 
facilitates  learning of the  most  appropriate  allocation of a  marketing  budget  among 
customers. 
In  a  difficult  learning  environment,  participants  receiving  CPA  information  made 
closer-to-optimal  budget  allocation  decisions,  resulting  in  higher  cumulative  profits 
compared  to  subjects  receiving  traditional  accounting  reports.  In  easier  learning 
environments,  CPA  yielded  a  smaller  additional  benefit  over  a  traditional  costing 
system combined with outcome feedback. 
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Today a large number of companies claim to be  customer-driven (Foster,  Gupta and 
Sjoblom,  1996).  Many  costs are  indeed  not  only  incurred  in  production but  also  in 
marketing, distribution, administration, research and development (SeInes, 1992). Foster 
and Gupta (1994) illustrate that in major industries selling, general and  administrative 
expenses range from 34 till 53% of  total sales. Many companies serve varied customers 
with heterogeneous demands and costs (Shapiro, Rangan, Moriarty and Ross,  1987). A 
market orientation, defined as the organisation's ability to respond to current and future 
customer needs (Kohli and Jaworski,  1990), is considered a distinctive competency that 
yields  a  competitive  advantage.  Goebel,  Marshall  and  Locander  (1998)  state  that 
market- and  customer-oriented activities represent  a major  investment for  a firm  and 
insight in ways various  customers  consume  these  resources  is  the  necessary  key  in 
implementing a market orientation. 
Despite  the  increased  customer  orientation  and  increasing  customer  costs  many 
companies still use traditional accounting systems to allocate customer costs to products 
or customers. Most management accounting systems focus on products, departments or 
regions.  Rarely can a  management  accounting  system produce customer profitability 
figures  (Anandarajan and Christopher,  1987; Foster,  Gupta and  Sjoblom,  1996; Innes 
and Mitchel, 1995; Swenson, 1995) and thereby contribute to understanding of  the cost 
of reaching and  serving particular types  of buyers (Johnson and  Kaplan,  1991).  In a 
traditional  accounting  system,  marketing  costs  are  allocated  among  customers using 
sales (volume) as a driver. It assumes that each dollar of  revenue contributes equally to 
net  income.  When  customers  are  heterogeneous,  revenues  as  well  as  service  and 
marketing costs may vary substantially across customers (Foster,  Gupta and  Sjoblom, 
1996; Ward,  1992), causing differences in customer profitability. Revenues may differ 
due to different  prices  or different  selling  volumes  across  customers.  Differences  in 
costs arise from various ways in which customers use a company's resources. Customers 
may  differ markedly  in the marketing  support  they  need.  It  is  more  costly  to serve 
customers  ordering  very  small  quantities  compared  to  customers  ordering  large 
quantities  of the  same  product.  Therefore,  the  resulting  contribution  margin  in  a 
traditional accounting system is  a poor indication of profitability and  often results in 
managers making the wrong decisions with severe consequences (SeInes, 1992). 
2 Several  authors  criticise  traditional  accounting  systems  and  propose  activity  based 
costing (ABC) as an alternative, claiming that it results in more appropriate cost figures 
(Foster, Gupta and  Sjoblom,  1996;  Goebel, Marshall and Locander,  1998;  Kaplan and 
Cooper,  1997;  SeInes,  1992). Because sales dollars as  an  allocation base mayor may 
not correlate highly with after-the-sale expenditures, they contend it is more logical and 
accurate to use actual service activities,  such as number of deliveries, to allocate these 
expenses.  There are different ways in which different  customers demand  a company's 
resources.  Customer profitability analysis  (CPA),  using  ABC,  identifies  the  activities 
stemming  from  servicing  a  particular  customer.  The  costs  of these  activities  are 
allocated to the customer that caused them, resulting in more accurate profit information 
(Petty and Goodman,  1996). The superior information provided by  CPA should allow 
managers to learn more from the feedback they receive from the market,  and achieve a 
better fit between their budget allocations and the needs of  the market. 
Research  on  the  use  of CPA  to  enhance  decision-making  is  very  limited.  Goebel, 
Marshall  and  Locander  (1998)  claim  that  despite  the  apparent  usefulness  of ABC 
information  in  enhancing  marketing  performance,  no  definitive  studies  exists  that 
specifically  address  the  impact  of ABC  information  on  marketing  decision  making. 
Foster  and  Gupta  (1994)  claim  that  an  unresolved  issue  today  is  the  effect  on 
management  decisions  of reporting  different  levels  of customer-related  information. 
Indeed,  much of the evidence is anecdotal or based on case studies (Auandarajan and 
Christopher, 1987; Foster, Gupta and Sjoblom, 1996; Kaplan and Cooper, 1997; SeInes, 
1992; Ward, 1992). The major contribution of our research is that it tries to fill this gap 
by investigating systematically whether and when accounting feedback in the form of 
CPA-information  (using  ABC)  will  improve  the  profitability  of marketing  budget 
allocation decisions. 
2.  Heuristics in functional learning and the role of accounting feedback 
Decision makers  do  not know all  parameters  of the  economic environment in which 
they operate (Day and Grooves,  1975) and are therefore unable to calculate the optimal 
allocation  which  results  in  maximum  profitability.  Even  if  managers  would  be 
completely  informed,  optimal  allocation  rules  would  be  difficult  to  calculate 
3 (Busemeyer,  Swenson  and  Lazarte,  1986).  In  the  absence  of  such  information, 
allocation decisions are  made  on the basis  of hunches,  traditions or easily justifiable 
heuristics.  It seems  reasonable  however  to  expect  that  these  allocation  rules  will 
improve after experience with outcome feedback. 
Dickhaut and Lere (1983) argue that decision makers in a repeated forecasting task with 
profit  feedback  use  simple  iterative  heuristic  procedures  to  approach  the  optimal 
solution.  Stevenson,  Busemeyer  and  Naylor  (1990)  label  this  the  "hill  climbing" 
heuristic. Metaphorically it can be compared with a hiker finding his way to the top of  a 
hill in the dark. If  a step leads uphill, then he will continue in the same direction, if a 
step  leads  downhill,  then  he  changes  directions.  Stevenson,  Busemeyer  and  Naylor 
(1990) state that this heuristic can be applied to resource allocation problems as well. If 
a previous change in allocation policy produces an  increase in the objective function 
value, then the next change will be in the same direction as the previously successful 
change.  For example,  let  us  assume  that  the  decision  maker  increases  profits  by 
increasing the budget allocated to customer A., and decreasing the budget to customer B. 
Following the heuristic, the next trial he will continue to increase the budget to A and to 
decrease the budget to B. However, if the previous change produces a decrease in the 
objective  function  value,  then  the  decision  maker  will  try  to improve  by  changing 
directions  (e.g.  by reducing  A's  budget  and/or  increasing  B's  budget).  Experimental 
results support the use of hill  climbing heuristics in repeated resource allocation tasks 
when  subjects  were  given  feedback  about  the  outcome  of their  allocation  policies 
(Busemeyer and Myung, 1987; Busemeyer, Swenson and Lazarte, 1986). 
Researchers  in  accounting  are  primarily  interested  in  the  effect  of  accounting 
information on the application of this heuristic,  and the resulting quality of allocation 
decisions. But the evidence on the use of  this learning principle in accounting is scarce. 
Turner and Hilton (1989) showed in an iterative forecasting task that subjects adjusted 
next-period production quantity forecasts according to a hill climbing heuristic (see also 
Dickhaut and Lere, 1983). Subjects received profits, computed under variable costing or 
absorption  costing,  as feedback.  If an  increase  in production  quantity  resulted  in  an 
increase  in  profits  computed  under  either  accounting  system,  the  majority  of the 
participants  increased  their  production  quantity  the  next  trial  as  predicted  by  the 
heuristic. 
4 Gupta and King (1997) reported the results of  an experiment with a repeated forecasting 
task.  They  found  that  subjects  adjusted  their product cost forecasts  according  to  an 
iterative procedure, after receiving profit feedback on their decisions. If  an increase in 
product  cost  forecast  resulted  in  an  increase  in  profits,  most  subjects  continued  to 
increase the forecast on the next trial. Half of  the participants were given a head start by 
providing more elaborated accounting information. At the beginning of the experiment 
this cost system using several cost drivers  displayed  a product cost forecast  closer to 
optimal  profit.  Subjects  anchored  on  this  point  and  started  making  adjustments 
following  the  iterative  procedure.  Subjects  with  baseline  (and  less  accurate)  cost 
information using only one driver, started from a point further away from optimal profit 
and therefore performed worse. The authors found  no evidence that a more elaborated 
(and  more  accurate)  accounting  system  would  have  more  value  in  a  complex 
environment compared to a simple environment.  This may be  due to the fact that both 
economic environments consisted  of linear demand  and  cost  structures and  that their 
subjects received accounting info  only once.  We  introduce non-linearity in  our setting 
and accounting information is provided after every trial. 
3.  Hypotheses 
Gupta  & King  (1997)  found  that  a more  accurate  accounting  system  using  several 
drivers  is  superior to a baseline  accounting  system.  Their  setting  consisted  of three 
different products, which  consumed  different amounts of resources  in  the production 
process.  In  today's  business  environment  customers  are  also  often  heterogeneous 
(Foster, Gupta and Sjoblom,  1996; Shapiro, Rangan, Moriarty and Ross,  1987) and the 
demands different customers place  on  a company's  resources  may  vary  substantially. 
Many  authors  claim that  allocating  marketing expenses  using  activity  drivers  (ABC) 
results  in  more  appropriate  customer  profitability  figures,  reflecting  the  differences 
between customers, compared to a traditional accounting system (Goebel, Marshall and 
Locander, 1998; Kaplan and Cooper, 1997; Petty and Goodman, 1996; SeInes,  1992). 
In our experiment, participants assume the role of marketing managers,  faced  with the 
task of allocating a sales budget among three different customers  in order to increase 
firm  profitability.  Besides  feedback  on  total  profits,  they  receive  after  every  trial 
5 accounting information that displays profits for each customer. CPA information using 
ABC  closely  approximates  real  economic  profit  differences  between  customers.  In a 
CPA report the influence of the  sales  budget  on  profitability per customer  is  better 
reflected. If  an increase in the sales budget allocated to  one customer increases profits, 
the CPA system will in most cases also display a profit increase for that customer. This 
reliable  profit  feedback  facilitates  hill  climbing  (Busemeyer,  Lazarte  and  Swenson, 
1986; Dickhaut and Lere, 1983) at the individual customer level.  Consequently subjects 
choose more appropriate adjustments in the subsequent period. 
Traditional accounting information, using sales as a cost driver, deviates markedly from 
underlying  economic  reality.  The  consequences  of a  sales  budget  allocation  on  the 
profitability per customer is  less  obvious  and  therefore  less reliable  for  applying  hill 
climbing  on  customer  level.  We  expect  that  subjects,  receiving  CPA  information, 
outperform participants receiving traditional accounting information: 
HI: People receiving CPA information will realise higher profits compared to subjects 
receiving traditional accounting systems in both economic environments. 
7t (CPA) > 7t (TRAD) 
Our  experiment  introduces  two  economic  environments  (Mantrala,  Prabhakant  and 
Zoltners,  1992) which differ in the degree of complexity (Gupta and King,  1997). We 
expect that the difference in performance between a CPA report and a traditional system 
in  a  simple environment  is  smaller.  In a  simple  learning  environment,  subjects  may 
learn a great deal from total profit feedback. The superior information which CPA using 
activity drives provides, may be secondary in improving firm profitability. 
In a complex environment it is  more  difficult to  learn from  total profit feedback  and 
reliable additional information on customer profitability may be required.  Busemeyer, 
Lazarte and  Swenson  (1986)  mention that additional  information over pure  outcome 
feedback  may  facilitate  learning.  Both  accounting  systems  provide  additional 
information but CPA approximates customer heterogeneity thereby providing reliable 
information at  customer level.  Therefore we  predict that CPA will  continue to allow 
reliable hill climbing in complex environments, where the traditional system may fail: 
6 H2: The value of  a CPA report is greater in a complex economic environment compared 
to a simple economic environment. 
7t (Complex  CPA) - 7t (Complex  TRAD)  >  7t (Simple  CPA) - 7t (Simple  TRAD) 
4. Experiment 
4.1. Experimental design 
In  our  experimental  design  two  factors  were  manipulated.  The  first  factor  is  the 
economic environment. About  half of our participants  were  assigned to  a  complex 
economic  environment  while  the  other  half  worked  in  a  more  simple  economic 
environment. The difference in complexity is due to the different shapes of  the response 
functions. This allowed us to evaluate the information value of a CPA report in learning 
environments differing in the degree of  complexity. 
The other factor is the costing system. About half of our subjects received a traditional 
accounting report (traditional information) using sales volume as cost driver. This report 
deviates noticeably from the underlying economic profitability structure, because sales 
volume is  a bad driver to allocate  customer costs.  The  other half of our participants 
received  a  CPA-report  (customer  profitability  information),  using  activities  as  cost 
drivers.  We  designed this CPA costing system  in  a way  that it  corresponds  close to 
economic profit reality. 
Economic environment 
Mantrala,  Prabhakant  and  Zoltners  (1992)  present  two  economic  environments, 
characterised by Concave and S-shaped sales response functions which are often used in 
marketing research (Arndt and  Simon,  1980; Little,  1970; Lodish,  1971; McIntyre and 
Ryans, 1983). These two alternative marketing environments are the building blocks of 
our experiment. We created three heterogeneous customers, varying substantially in the 
cost of  serving (Kaplan and Cooper, 1997). 
7 In Table  1,  revenues (TR) respond to sales visit hours (Xi)  invested in each customer. 
Appendix A shows that the parameters of  the sales response functions (ki,  bi,  A.i,  /!i,  Pi) 
are responsible for important revenue differences between customers (Foster, Gupta and 
Sjoblom,  1996).  Customer  A  is  characterised  by a  small  maximum  potential  sales 
volume and maximum sales is achieved by investing a small number of sales visit hours 
(quick response).  Client B has  a large potential sales volume but its response to sales 
visit  hours  is  much  slower.  Customer  C  positions  itself somewhere  in  the  middle 
(medium sales volume and medium sales response). 
Table 1: The two economic environments and their functional forms (i= A,B,C) 
Total Revenues 
Total Costs 




Concave  S-shaped 
TRi = ki [l-exp(-bixi)]  TRi= Ai + ki [Xi).U I( xt  + p;)] 
~---------~---------/ 
TVCi=PXi 
TDCi = (k  TRi)q + a TRi 
TLCi = (k  TRi)q 
TPCi=mTRi 
Cost differences are introduced at the level of  three post production costs. The first post 
production  cost in our experiment  is  total  sales  visit  cost  (TVC).  Subjects  have  to 
allocate sales visit hours (Xi), but the cost of using sales visit hours increases as  more 
sales  visit  hours  are  allocated  to  a  particular  customer.  Consistent  with  marketing 
assumptions (Foster and Gupta,  1994), we assume that sales visit is a flexible resource. 
One hour of sales visit is hired at a fixed price P (see Table 1).  Other post production 
costs are total delivery costs (TDC) and total logistic costs (TLC).  In  the operations 
management literature, delivery  costs are often assumed to be concave in function of 
demand  (Klincewicz,  1990; Khumawala and  Kelly,  1974).  By  introducing the power 
q = Yz  (see  Appendix  A),  both functions  become concave  in  demand,  indicating that 
there  are  economies  to  scale  in  delivering  large  customers  (Klincewicz,  1990). 
Customer B,  characterised by  a large demand,  will  incur proportionally less  delivery 
and logistic costs compared to customer A and C. 
Since our focus is on post production costs, total production cost (TPC) is defined as a 
fixed margin of revenue. Figure 1 displays the profit differences in terms of sales visit 
hours between the three different types of  customers for both economic environments. 
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Figure 1:  The profit (  objective) functions for both economic environments 
Manipulation of  complexity 
There  are  many  factors  influencing  learning  performance  in  hill  climbing  problems. 
Busemeyer, Swenson and Lazarte (1986) define eight factors in which the shape of the 
objective function is one factor that may influence learning performance.  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974)  define  several  heuristics  that  may  obstruct learning.  One  of these 
heuristics  is  the  anchor  and  adjustment  heuristic.  The  basic  principle  is  that  people 
given a starting point (initial value) make adjustments from the starting point to yield a 
final answer. Another starting point will yield a different final answer. 
In our experiment we expect learning performance between the two environments to be 
influenced by  the fact  that people overallocate (adjustment)  the budget of sales visit 
hours  starting  from  the  initial  starting  point  (anchor).  Ackoff and  Emshoff (1975) 
describe  a  case  in  which  marketing  managers  were  unwilling to  reduce  advertising 
budgets.  Although their  research  showed  that  decreasing  the  budget  for  advertising 
could increase profits, managers were unwilling to act on this information. 
In our setting subjects started from  an allocation policy in which the company initially 
invested 156 hours in total (52 hours per customer). This can be considered as an anchor 
point.  In both economic  environments  subjects  were  45%  away  from  optimal  profit 
(Appendix  B).  Figure 2  shows  the  profits  for  the  large  customer  in  both  economic 
environments,  which at  the  starting  point  are  almost  the  same.  Due to  the  fact  that 
participants allocate more sales visit hours than the initially installed budget,  people in 
the concave environment are more heavily punished in profits (Figure 2 shows a large 
9 decrease in profits) compared to the S-shaped environment (lower decrease in profits). 
Therefore  we  define  the  concave  environment  as  a  complex  learning  environment, 
because  subjects  must  learn that  overallocating  from  the  anchor has  a  more  severe 
impact  on  profits.  The  S-shaped  environment  is  more  simple  because  the  profit 
consequences  of initial  overinvestment  are  much  smaller  leading  subjects  to better 
performance. 
profit large customer 
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Figure 2: Consequences of  overallocation 
Given  the  overinvestment  at the  starting  value,  we  expect the  benefit  of CPA over 
traditional  costing  system  will  be  more  pronounced  in  the  concave  (complex) 
environment than in the S-shaped environment. In other words, CPA information in the 
complex  environment  unmasks  the  severe  consequences  of overallocation  and  as  a 
reaction  participants  will  take  more  appropriate  adjustment  choices  (Busemeyer  and 
Myung,1987). 
Costing systems 
The  traditional  system  does  not  display  different  marketing  costs.  It is  common 
practice to combine these  costs into  aggregate functional  categories,  such  as  general 
selling and marketing expenses (Johnson and Kaplan,  1991). In our traditional costing 
system total customer cost is allocated to  individual customers using total revenues as 
cost driver. This is a poor approximation of reality because high-volume customers will 
receive  costs  in  function  of this  large  demand,  which  will  overestimate  the  costs 
10 actually  incurred.  The  small  customer  will  be  allocated  lower  costs  than  actually 
incurred. 
Our CPA system has three cost pools,  corresponding to real  economic cost structure. 
The three cost pools are total visit costs, logistic costs and delivery costs. For the total 
visit cost, our CPA system uses total sales visit hours as the activity driver. Hence the 
allocation of  this cost to the three types of customers is the same as real economic cost 
structure. The activity driver used to allocate the total delivery cost (total logistic cost) 
to  customers  is  number of deliveries (picking movements).  The CPA system assumes 
that the large customer B needs fewer deliveries (picking movements) compared to the 
small customer A for the same proportion of demand. It is  intuitively clear that in this 
manner customer B will receive proportionally less delivery costs (logistic costs). This 
also corresponds with underlying economic cost structure. The concave cost structures 
created economies of  scale in delivering a large customer. 
We  adhered  to three necessary  conditions formulated  by  Noreen (1991)  for  ABC  to 
provide relevant costs for  decision making. The first condition is that total cost can be 
partitioned into cost pools, each of  which depends solely on one activity (cost function 
being  separable).  The  second  condition  is  that  the  cost  pools  have  to  be  strictly 
proportional  to  activity.  The  third  condition  mentions  that  the  cost  driver  itself is 
additive across individual product demands.  Noreen and  Soderstrom (1994) show that 
condition two does not always hold in reality, due to economies to scale when the level 
of activity increases. To make our setting realistic, we define some elements of costs to 
be concave in demand, representing economies to scale.  In the CPA system these costs 
are approximated by local linear functions.  Christensen and Demski (1995) state that if 
the purpose of  the costing exercise is to improve the function of a less than completely 
specified cost expression, the exercise rests on a cost-benefit test. We design the CPA 
system  in  such  a  way  that  it  approximates  the  cost  consequences  of  demand 
heterogeneity  and  assume  that  it  results  into  better decision  making  (benefit  of an 
improved costing system). 
Appendix B  displays the profit  margins in  the real economic environment, the CP A-
system and the traditional system, at the start of  the experiment. It is obvious that CPA 
information, as accounting feedback, is closer to the real picture. Subjects provided with 
11 CPA,  can better judge where they are located on the hill  of the obj ective function for 
each  customer  and  realise  when  to  reduce  or to  increase  their  sales  visit  hours 
(Busemeyer, Swenson and Lazarte,  1986).  The profit information on customers which 
subjects  receive  from  traditional  systems  is  less  informative  because  it  deviates 
markedly from economic reality. 
4.2. Experimental Task 
Participants were recruited from  a graduate management accounting course at a large 
West-European university.  They were all  graduate students -on average 23  years old-
with  a  university  degree,  completing  a  Masters  program  in  applied  economics  or 
insurance. The accounting course had already treated the differences between ABC and 
traditional  systems  and  it  had  dealt  with the use  of ABC  for  customer profitability 
analysis.  A  total  of 139  students  completed the task on  a  computer.  Students were 
randomly  assigned  to  one  of the  four  experimental  conditions  when  entering  the 
experimental room. Sessions lasted one hour. To induce a motivational aspect, subjects 
were notified in  advance that the four best players would receive  a gift  coupon!  for 
books or CD's worth the counterpart of  approximately € 20. 
Before the  experiment  started,  students  received  a few  pages  of instructions  on the 
computer screen. The subj ects were provided with information of  a company specialised 
in  the  production  of home  protection  systems  (electronic  shutter  systems,  fencing 
systems, fly  screens etc ... ).  Participants received a description of the company's three 
clients that differed in potential sales volume and in the consumption of the company's 
resources  (see  cost  structure).  Client  A  was described  as  a  self-employed  carpenter 
ordering small quantities in different sizes and colours. Customer B was presented as a 
building contractor with a large sales volume ordering large quantities of  the same sizes 
and colours. Customer C represented a home protection shop store with a medium size 
sales volume. Initially the company invested a level of 52 hours per customer, in total 
156 sales visit hours (Appendix B).  The purpose of  the task was to reallocate the budget 
of sales  visit  hours,  during  10  trials,  in  order to  increase  firm  profitability.  In total 
subjects could allocate no more than 200 sales visit hours over the three customers. 
1 In reality we rewarded the best player in each of the four conditions with a coupon. 
12 At  the  starting  point,  participants  in  both  environments  were  45%  removed  from 
optimal  profit,  which  gave  them  ample  opportunity  to  improve.  After  each  trial 
participants received an imperfect accounting report (see Appendix B) as feedback. Half 
of the  participants  were  provided  with  CPA information,  while  the  others  received 
traditional  accounting  reports.  After  each  trial,  the  computer  displayed  the  chosen 
allocation policy and corresponding total profit on the screen,  which remained on the 
screen until the end of the experiment.  After completion of the 10 trials, the program 
automatically finished.  Participants filled out a questionnaire, containing several items 
(on a five-point scale) testing their motivation and their use of accounting information. 
The  131  students,  who filled  out the questionnaire  correctly,  were  highly  motivated 
(average:  3.996  and  median  4)  whereby  subjects  in  the  simple  environment  were 
slightly more motivated than subjects in the complex condition (F(l, 127):  3.78; p < .06). 
Importantly, no difference in motivation was detected for the accounting report type. 
5. Results 
This paragraph discusses the main results of the experiment. First of all we report the 
subject's average score and the subject's best score per experimental cell and draw some 
preliminary conclusions. The next section introduces a regression model, incorporating 
the effect that subjects are able to learn over time. 
5.1. Summary Statistics 
We first of  all report the means per experimental cell of  the subjects' average percentage 
opportunity  loss  over the  10  trials.  It is  defined  as  the  average  of the  differences 
between the  optimal  profit  (nO)  and  profits  realised  by  a  subject  in  a  round  (nit), 
expressed as a percentage of  optimal profit (Gupta & King, 1997): 
n  t 
AVG LOSS2=1  ~ 1  ~ n*-nit 
- -;:;  i=ltj=l~ 
n = the number of  subjects per cell 
t =  the number of  trials 
2 At the start, the distance from optimal profit in the S-shaped condition was 45,14% whereas in the 
concave condition this distance was only 44,99 %. We therefore multiply the percentage opportunity 
loss in the S-shaped condition in each trial with a factor 0,9967 ( = 44,99/44,15). 
13 The lower a subject's average opportunity loss, the closer subjects are to optimal profit. 
We also computed the subject's best score, defined as the round in which the subject is 
closest  to  optimal  profit.  Table  2  reports  the  result  of both  test  metrics  for  each 
experimental condition. 
n 
BEST = 1 L,  n =  the number of  subj ects per cell 
t =  the number of  trials 
Table 2:  The subjects' average scores and best scores per experimental cell 
1t {Trad) - 1t {CPA) 
Traditional  CPA  1t(Trad) 
Complex (Concave) 
Mean average % loss  0,36368  0,29538  0,18780 
Mean best score  0,18144  0,10151  0,44053 
Nwnber of subjects (n)  34  35 
Simple (S-shaped) 
Mean average % loss  0,32199  0,29254  0,09146 
Mean best score  0,12465  0,11061  0,11264 
Nwnber of subjects (n)  33  37 
Participants receiving CPA do  better (lower average opportunity loss  and best  score) 
than people provided with traditional accounting systems (HI). People in the S-shaped 
condition perform better mainly  in the case of traditional  information,  indicating that 
this is a simpler learning environment. Hypothesis two predicts that the value of a CPA 
report  is  higher  in  a  complex  (concave)  environment.  The  mean  average  %  loss 
indicates that the improvement people realise in this environment, by receiving a CPA 
report (18,78%), is much higher compared to the simple S-shaped condition (9,146%). 
The difference in value of CPA over traditional info between the two environments is 
even more pronounced when we look at the subject's best score (see Table 2). 
5.2. The regression "learning" model 
In this section, we  introduce a regression model,  which incorporates  several learning 
effects. The model contains main effects of  accounting system (to test HI), environment 
and the interaction of system and  environment (to test H2).  Besides better accounting 
information and the influence of  the learning environment, decision makers should also 
14 be able to learn from mere profit feedback (Gupta and King, 1997). We therefore added 
cumulative experience (reflected by the trial number) to the model. 
The percentage opportunity loss3  depends thus on the accounting system S (S  is  1 for 
CPA and 0 for Traditional), the environment E (E is 1 for Simple and 0 for Complex), 
the interaction term SE and on the variable cumulative feedback T (T=1,2, ... ,10) where 
T represents the trial number. Besides a linear regression model we also test an inverse 
relationship between the opportunity loss  and  the trial  number,  because we expect  a 
subject's percentage opportunity loss to decline most steeply during the first few trials 
and gradually decline towards a certain positive value (bo in the inverse model). Figure 3 
indicates that such a relationship may be present in our data: 
Linear Model:  %Lj,t = bo  + bl T + b2 S + b3  E + b4 SE + e 
Inverse Model:  %Lj,t = bo  + bl-L  + b2 S + b3  E + b4 SE + e 
T 
Where %Li,t is the percentage deviation against optimal profit for subject i (i = 
1,2, ... ,139) in trial t (t = 1,2,  ... , 10). This gives in total 1390 observations; 
o/d...  -+-Tra:l Ccn::aIe 
-II-Tra:l &s~ 
0.6  -.-CPA Ccn::aIe 
~CPA~ 
0.4 
0.2  . 
2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
trial 
Figure 3: Trial by trial average opportunity loss (%L) in the four 
experimental conditions 
3 defined as the subject's percentual distance from optimal profit in round t: o/oL.t=(n *  - n.t)ln  * 
15 Inherent in  learning tasks is  the  presence of non-constant variance of the error terms 
(heteroscedasticity). Because of  the fact that participants gain experience in the task (T), 
we expect the variance of the error terms to decrease  over the trials.  White's  (1980) 
general test for heteroscedasticity concluded that the error terms  in both our models 
lacked constant variance.  The weighted least squares method4 which corrects for non-
constant variance of  the error terms (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim and Wasserman,  1996) 
was used to  estimate the coefficients.  These regression  results are given in Table  3; 
White's test indicated no presence ofheteroscedasticity. 
Table 3: Results of  the regression analysis for both models 
using weighted least squares (n=1390) 
Parameter estimates 
LINEAR 
Intercept  0.5618  * 
Cumul (T)  -0.0375  * 
System (S)  -0.0714  * 
Environ (E)  -0.0460 ** 
Syst*Envir (SE)  0.0549 ** 
F-value  59.184 * 
Adjusted R2  0.1435 
*  Significant at the 1% level 
**  Significant at the 5% level 
INVERSE 
0.2027  * 
0.5414  * 
-0.0714  * 
-0.0460 ** 
0.0549 ** 
67.238  * 
0.1602 
The variable T  is  significant at the 1  %  level.  Although provided with imperfect cost 
reports, people improve over time, indicating that they are able to learn from total profit 
feedback.  The inverse model  has  a higher R-square indicating that improvements are 
sharp  during  the first  rounds  and  gradually  decline  to  a  certain  positive  value.  The 
inverse model assumes that the learning ability of a decision maker is  limited because 
after a certain number of  trials he will not improve anymore. 
Hypothesis HI  is  confirmed  at  the 1%  significance level.  People  receiving  customer 
profitability information perform better (lower opportunity loss) than subjects receiving 
traditional accounting systems in both environments. A CPA report apparently provides 
more relevant information for  subjects applying hill  climbing heuristics.  Items in  the 
post  questionnaire  checked  the  subject's  use  of accounting  information  for  both 
accounting systems. They revealed that participants in the traditional condition used the 
4 We used square root of  T as weight, assuming that the variance of  the error tenus decreased with T. 
16 cost reports less extensively to (F(I, 127): 3.96; p < .05) and that they considered the cost 
reports to be less relevant (F(I, 127):  5.86; p < .02).  People receiving CPA concentrated 
more  on  profit  margins  per  customer  compared  to  participants  receiving  traditional 
accounting  systems  (F(1,  127):  11,74;  p  <  .01),  reinforcing  the  conclusion  that  CPA 
provided more relevant information for the decision. 
The  interaction term has  the correct  sign  and  is  significant  at  the 5% level,  thereby 
confirming  hypothesis  H2.  A  CPA  report  has  more  value  in  a  complex  learning 
environment  compared to the  more  simple  S-shaped  condition.  These  results  largely 
depend  on the fact  that  subjects tend  to  overallocate the budget of sales  visit  hours. 
Appendix  C  shows  that  overallocation  manifests  itself during  every  trial.  However, 
subjects in the CPA condition did  start closer to optimal allocations (especially for the 
least  profitable  customer  C)  and  learned  better  from  experience  (more  appropriate 
allocation choices for customer A and B in later trials). The incremental value of a CPA 
system in a complex environment is  due  to the fact  that  CPA illuminates the  severe 
consequences  of overallocation.  Subjects  in  a  complex  environment  receiving  CPA 
therefore  reduced the budget with  larger  amounts  (see  appendix  C;  reduction  of 55 
hours), tempering the consequences of overallocation. From these results it is clear that 
CPA  subjects  in  the  complex  condition  do  better  because  the  accounting  system 
provides  them  with  the  opportunity  to  alleviate  the  anchoring  bias  (Tversky  and 
Kahneman, 1974) caused by the starting allocations. 
6.  Discussion 
Our  experiment  demonstrated that  decision  makers  receiving  customer  profitability 
analysis (CPA) reports were able to make  more profitable marketing budget allocation 
decisions compared to decision makers receiving traditional accounting information. In 
contrast to prior research (Gupta and King,  1997), we also found that the benefit of  CP A 
was  more  pronounced  in  a  more  complex  learning  environment.  We  attribute  this 
difference to our choice for  a complex learning situation,  which more closely reflects 
the learning difficulties faced  in real  business decision environments.  Real world cost 
and demand functions are rarely, if  ever, linear. Prior research may have been operating 
at  the  low  end  of environmental  complexity,  in  which  the  added  value  of good 
accounting information is hard to detect. 
17 In our study,  part of the complexity was also  induced by making the participants start 
from an initial overall budget that was higher than optimal. Marketing decision makers 
may be overly reluctant to decrease budgets due to the general belief that one needs to 
increase  budgets  in  order to  increase  sales.  If profits  would  decline  after  a  budget 
decrease,  it  would  be  easy  for the  company to attribute the failure  to the manager's 
action.  A  profit  decrease  following  a budget  increase  is  more  readily  attributed  to 
unforeseen external circumstances.  Other priors  may  influence allocation decisions as 
well. For example, decision makers may be inclined to allocate budgets proportional to 
sales  volume,  or use  other situation  and  case-specific decision rules.  Obviously,  such 
decision rules - in reality just like in our experiment - are not always warranted by the 
data. 
Decision  makers  improve  their  budget  allocations  period  by  period,  based  on  the 
accumulating outcome feedback and using additional costing information they receive. 
Priors  and  biases  may  slow  down  this  learning  process.  In  general,  the  benefit  of 
accounting information in managerial decision making is that it  allows the manager to 
make data driven decisions, rather than having to rely on possibly faulty priors.  Costing 
systems facilitate learning to the extent that they provide the manager with specific data 
allowing the manager to diagnose the invalidity of her priors and decision heuristics. In 
our study, customer level cost information on a highly heterogeneous set of customers 
provided the decision makers with these specific data. 
Obviously the manager also learns from mere outcome feedback.  Even without costing 
information, adaptations in successive allocations are not random.  The manager learns 
from  prior  successes  and  mistakes.  The  heuristic  guiding  this  learning  process  has 
previously  been  described  as  hill  climbing.  We  argue  that  additional  accounting 
information  will  help  the  decision  maker  to  fine-tune  the  hill  climbing  process.  Its 
largest benefit should come when a decision results in a decrease of  profits compared to 
prior periods. Hill climbing then prescribes a change of policy, but in most cases many 
alternatives for change  are  open to the decision maker.  Good accounting  information 
proves its value because it will  help  reduce the set of alternative courses of action to 
those that have a higher probability of  being successful. 
18 One  may  wonder  whether  traditional  accounting  information  with  sales-based  cost 
allocations provides any information over mere outcome feedback to improve the hill 
climbing process. Decision makers may  even stop paying attention to this information 
when they learn that it does not help them improve allocation decisions.  To the extent 
that they  do  continue to  pay  attention,  a traditional  system  may  promote the use  of 
unwarranted decision rules (like allocating proportional to sales).  Future research may 
concentrate on the nature of  the learning process through which hill climbing becomes 
more efficient. It could examine which level of task specificity of the information is 
needed to help decision makers alleviate existing (or experimentally induced) biases. 
In the current study we manipulated complexity on the demand side.  This is justifiable 
in  a marketing scenario, but there are of course many  different sources of complexity. 
Prior research  studying production  allocation  decisions  introduced  heterogeneity  and 
complexity on the cost side. Cost and demand side complexities may be studied in more 
detail in future research. 
In our study, the CPA condition differed from the traditional information condition not 
only  in  the  specificity  and  appropriateness  of the  information but  also  in  the  mere 
amount  of information.  Future  work  should  try  to  disentangle  these  two  effects. 
Decision  makers  may  be  more  motivated  when the  mere  volume  of information  is 
higher.  Motivation  may  also  increase  because  the  decision  maker  learns  that  the 
information helps her to  control the  situation and  maker better decisions.  But merely 
increasing  the  amount  of information  may  have  adverse  consequences  when  the 
additional  information  is  not  diagnostic  for  the  specific  task  under  study.  This 
information may misguide the decision maker. 
There has now been a relatively long history of discussion about the benefits of CPA, 
and  other  ABC  systems,  relative  to  traditional  costing  systems.  Further  progress 
requires a change of focus from whether ABC  systems have beneficial effects to when 
and  especially  how  and  why  these  effects  are  obtained.  Only  detailed  descriptive 
research into the role accounting information plays in the processes of making decisions 
and learning to make better decisions will allow us to build adequate theory, which in 
tum can guide pragmatic advice to the business community. 
19 APPENDIX A 
Val  f  fi  h  ues 0  . parameters  or t  e revenue fu nctIOns 
CONCAVE  S-SHAPED 
k  b  A.  k  IJ.  P 
TRA (small)  5000000  0,0900  750000  4250000  3,00  2000 
TRB (large)  15000000  0,0254  1000000  14000000  2,90  34200 
TRc (medium)  11000000  0,0380  500000  10500000  2,19  1200 
Values of  the parameters for the cost functions 
TVC  P=40000 
TDC  k=110000; a= 0.01; q =Y2 
TLC  k=50000; q=Y2 
}PC  m=0.50 
APPENDIXB 
The company initially invested 52  sales  visit  hours in  every  customer.  In the case of 
concave sales response functions, this results in a deviation of about 45% from optimal 
profit so there was opportunity to improve.  The  S-shaped function also deviates 45% 
from  optimal  profit  but  is  not  displayed  here.  The  real  underlying  cost  structure 
(beneath; concave environment) shows that customer A is generating a loss. Subjects do 
not receive this kind of information; they receive imperfect cost reports after every trial. 
Real economic enviroument (concave response :firoctions) 
CUSTA  margin  CUSTB  margin  CUSTC  margin  TOTAL  margin 
Xi  52  52  52  156 
TR  4953605  10996175  9475151  25424931 
}PC  2476802  50.00%  5468087  50.00%  4737576  50.00%  12712465  50.00% 
TCC  3365382  67.94%  4031261  36.66%  3883967  40.99%  11280610  44.37% 
TVC  2080000  41.99%  2080000  18.92%  2080000  21.95%  6240000  24.54% 
TDC  787707  15.90%  1209770  11.00%  1115666  11.77%  3113144  12.24% 
TLC  497674  10.05%  741491  6.74%  688301  7.26%  1927466  7.58% 
1C  -888580  -17.94%  1466826  13.34%  853609  9.01%  1431856  5.63% 
Optuna1n  % devmuon 
2602705  44.99% 
At  the  start  of the  experiment,  subjects  in  the  CPA  condition  received  following 
customer  profitability  report  as  feedback.  Clearly,  the  information  is  very  close  to 
reality.  Customer A is  generating a loss  in  reality,  which is  also  indicated  in  a CPA 
report. 
20 Profitability report on the basis of  customer profitability information (CPA) 
CUSTA  margin  CUSTB  Margin  CUSIC  margin  Iotal  margin 
Revenue  4953605  10996175  9475151  25424931 
Production cost  2476802  50.00%  5498087  50.00%  4737576  50.00%  12712465  50.00% 
Customer cost  3491972  70.50%  3812906  34.67%  3975733  41.96%  11280610  44.37% 
Driver rate  #  cost  #  Cost  #  cost 
visit  40000  52  2080000  52  2080000  52  2080000 
delivery  4111  198  814537  275  1130085  284  1168522 
logistics  1096,4  545  597435  550  602820  663  727211 
Profit  -1015169  -20.5%  1685182  15.33%  761843  8.04%  1431856  5.63% 
Participants in the traditional scenario only received following information at the start. 
They merely can rely on total cost figures.  The profit margin is for each customer the 
same and customer A is even indicated as profitable. 
Profitability report on the basis of  traditional information 
CUSTA  margin  CUSTB  Margin  CUSIC  margin  Total  margin 
Revenue  4953605  10996175  9475151  25424931 
Production cost  2476802  50.00%  5498087  50.00%  4737576  50.00%  12712465  50.00% 
Customer cost  2197830  44.37%  4878816  44.37%  4203964  44.37%  11280610 44.37% 
Profit  278972  5.63%  619272  5.63%  533612  5.63%  1431856  5.63% 
It  is useful to get an insight on how total delivery costs (3.133.144) are allocated using a 
CPA system with number of deliveries as  an activity driver compared to a traditional 
system using total revenues as cost driver.  The CPA assumes that customer B needs in 
proportion to its demand, fewer deliveries compared to customer C and A 
# deliveries per  Revenues 
100000 revenues  (TR) 
A (small)  4  4953605 
B (large)  2,5  10996175 
C (medium)  3  9475151 
Total revenue  25424931 
Number of  deliveries for customer A = 4 x 4953605 
100000 
= 198,1442 deliveries 
Number of  deliveries for customer B = 2.5 x 10996175  = 274,9044 deliveries 
100000 
Number of  deliveries for customer C = 3 x 9475151  = 284,2545 deliveries 
100000 
Total number of  deliveries  = 757,3031 deliveries 
Costdriverrate=3113144  =  4110,8296costperdelivery 
757,3031 
21 Delivery cost allocated to A = 4110,8296 x 198,1442 =  814537 (16,44%) 
Delivery cost allocated to B =  4110,8296 x 274,9044 = 1130085 (10,27%) 
Delivery cost allocated to C = 4110,8296 x 284,2545 = 1168522 (12,33%) 
In a traditional costing system, total revenue is used to allocate delivery costs (which 
can be easily computed). The table beneath displays that allocations generated by a CPA 
system are closer to real economic cost structure compared to the traditional systems. 
The same exercise can be done for the logistic costs and will give similar conclusions. 
TDC (Real)  Margin  TDC(CPA)  Margin  TDC (Trad)  Margin 
Customer A  787707  15,90%  814537  16,44%  606542  12,24 % 
CustomerB  1209770  11,00%  1130085  10,27%  1346421  12,24 % 
CustomerC  1115666  11,77%  1168522  12,33%  1160181  12,24 % 
Total  3113144  12,24%  3113144  12,24%  3113144  12,24% 
APPENDIXC 
AVERAGE ALLOCATION PER TRIAL AND PER EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION 
TRAD_CONCAVE  TRAD_S-SHAPED 
A  B  C  TOT  A  B  C  TOT 
T1  40.2  81.8  55.2  177.2  T1  47.8  79.1  57.7  184.6 
T2  46.0  62.7  51.6  160.3  T2  41.1  78.9  54.8  174.7 
T3  35.5  65.8  51.4  152.7  T3  37.9  77.2  53.5  168.6 
T4  31.3  62.5  52.3  146.1  T4  34.0  74.5  50.5  159.0 
T5  27.5  63.3  50.3  141.1  T5  30.6  72.4  50.8  153.8 
T6  27.5  64.3  45.0  136.8  T6  29.6  67.5  50.3  147.4 
T7  27.9  63.0  48.3  139.3  T7  26.6  69.3  50.5  146.4 
T8  26.5  61.2  42.7  130.5  T8  25.3  70.2  49.5  145.0 
T9  24.9  62.0  42.1  129.0  T9  24.5  67.6  47.7  139.9 
T10  25.3  65.9  41.4  132.5  T10  25.4  67.6  47.7  140.7 
opt  15.0  53.0  37.0  105.0  opt  19.0  62.0  42.0  123.0 
Difference in total hours  allocated  Difference in total hours allocated 
between the first and the last trial  44.7  between the first and the last trial  43.9 
CPA_CONCAVE  CPA_S-SHAPED 
A  B  C  TOT  A  B  C  TOT 
T1  39.9  82.8  56.2  178.9  T1  36.4  77.7  62.5  176.6 
T2  34.1  70.3  58.6  163.1  T2  33.7  74.5  57.2  165.4 
T3  25.2  68.5  51.8  145.5  T3  28.2  68.8  53.6  150.6 
T4  23.2  66.7  49.2  139.1  T4  24.6  69.8  54.6  149.0 
T5  18.6  58.3  45.7  122.6  T5  20.4  69.3  51.1  140.8 
T6  19.7  60.3  49.1  129.2  T6  18.0  71.1  49.3  138.4 
T7  15.2  61.8  49.4  126.4  T7  16.7  71.7  49.9  138.3 
T8  17.3  59.1  46.2  122.6  T8  19.0  65.3  47.7  132.0 
T9  16.3  62.2  44.2  122.7  T9  17.1  66.2  47.0  130.3 
T10  16.1  61.8  45.1  123.0  T10  16.3  68.1  48.7  133.1 
opt  15.0  53.0  37.0  105.0  opt  19.0  62.0  42.0  123.0 
Difference in total hours allocated  Difference in total hours allocated 
between the first and the last trial  55.9  between the first and the last trial  43.5 
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